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actions 43 awaiting a final decision upon the precise issue of whether
the existence of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of
limitations. While it is clear that the holding in the principal
cases removes the defense of the statute of limitations to actions
brought on violations which occurred many years ago, it should
be remembered that the gathering of evidence and proof of damages
44
on such claims will present a formidable task to plaintiffs.
Although there has been considerable confusion with regard
to the congressional intent, the Second and Eighth Circuits seem
to have adopted the ancient legal maxim that courts are not
disposed to allow a party to profit from his own wrong. The
Tenth Circuit in a recent decision has adopted the result reached
by the instant cases. 45 Consequently, there is no doubt that a
federal trend is emerging, but it remains for the United States
Supreme Court to effect the judicial clarity urgently required in
this growing area of civil litigation.
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Plaintiff, administratrix
of a New York domiciliary killed when defendant's airliner crashed
in Massachusetts, instituted a wrongful death action pursuant to
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute 1 in a federal district court
in New York, jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship.
Defendant's motion to limit the recovery to $15,000 as prescribed
by the Massachusetts statute was denied by the district court on
the ground that the New York Court of Appeals had previously
declared that the limitation was contrary to New York's public
policy and not binding on New York courts.2 The Court of Appeals
VIOLATION OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.-

43 Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 7140, 10th Cir., March
15, 1963.

44 Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U.L. RV.
29, 52 (1962).

45 Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., supra note 43.
1
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (1955).
"If the proprietor of a
common carrier of passengers . . . by reason of his or its negligence . . .
causes the death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in damages in the

sum of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars,
to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant.

. . .2Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40,
172 N.E.2d 526,
528, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1961) (dictum).
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for the Second Circuit 3 reversed, one judge dissenting, holding
that the district court's refusal to apply the Massachusetts limitation violated the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. On rehearing en banc, the Court reversed the decision
of the panel, three judges dissenting, and held that in a wrongful
death action, it is not a violation of the full faith and credit clause
for a forum, wherein decedent was domiciled and defendant
transacts a large segment of its business, for reasons of public
policy, to refuse to recognize the damage limitation of a sister
state's statute upon which the cause of action is based. Pearson
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (1962), cert. denied,
83 Sup. Ct. 726 (1963).
Traditionally, in the conflict of laws area, where a tort committed in one state is sued on in another state, the substantive
law of the state wherein the tort was committed is controlling,
while the forum applies its owns procedural rules. 4 In light of
this it would appear that the determination of whether damages
are substantive or procedural should determine whether the law
of Massachusetts or the law of New York is controlling on the
amount recoverable.
In an early New York case, Wooden v. Western V. Y. &
Penn. R.R., 5 the Court of Appeals held that damages are strictly
remedial and do not in any way affect a plaintiff's rights or his
cause of action. However, this does not seem to be the generally
accepted view.6 Judge Cardozo, in the later case of Loucks v.
Standard Oil of N. Y., refused to extend or apply the rule of
Wooden.8 That case also concerned the applicability of the
Massachusetts limitation on damages in a wrongful death action,
but the court did not find the limitation to be against the public
policy of New York and held that it was binding on New York
courts in assessing damages. 9
Chief judge Desmond, however, in Kilbergq v. Northeast Airlines, Irc., upon which the district court in the present case relied,
3
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (1962).
4

fBaldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E.2d 412 (1945); Johnson v.
Phoenix Bridge Co., 197 N.Y. 316, 90 N.E. 953 (1910); Murray v. New
York, Ont. & W.R.R., 242 App. Div. 374, 376, 275 N.Y. Supp. 10, 12 (1st
Dep't 1934) ; 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584.1 (1935) ; see RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§391-92 (1934).
5 126 N.Y. 10, 16-17, 26 N.E. 1050, 1051 (1891).

6 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914); Cuba R.R.
v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912): Royal Indem. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 297 N.Y. 619, 75 N.E.2d 631 (1947); Colliton v. United
Shipyards, Inc., 256 App. Div. 923, 9 N.Y.S.2d 784 (2d Dept), aff'd wen..
281 N.Y. 582, 22 N.E.2d 161 (1939): Curtis v. Campbell, 76 F.2d 84
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 737 (1935).
7 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
8 Id. at 109, 120 N.E. at 201.
9
id. at 111-12, 120 N.E. at 202.
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concluded that the substantive-procedural question was not settled
in New York. 10 Since New York provides for unlimited damages
in wrongful death actions, 1 he reasoned that the Massachusetts
limitation was against the public policy of New York. That being
the case, New York is not required to apply the Massachusetts
limitation,'12 and therefore, Judge Desmond treated the measure
of damages as a procedural matter, to be governed by the law
of New York. 13 He stated, however, that the plaintiff must still4
rely on the Massachusetts statute to establish his cause of action.1
The position taken by Judge Desmond, that a plaintiff must
rely on the Massachusetts statute for a cause of action but can
recover damages measured by the New York law, had been
expressly rejected by Mr. Justice Holmes in Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R. 15 He stated that it would be "unjust to allow the
plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law
for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the defendant the
benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law would
impose." 16 The notion that the lex loci determines whether or
not a tort has been committed and that the lex fori determines
17
the amount of liability was found to be clearly unacceptable. '
It cannot be said that the dictum in Kilberg classifies New
York as a state which considers damages a matter of procedure
in all actions. Judge Desmond prefaced the classification of damages as procedural with the determination that the Massachusetts
limitation was against the strong public policy in New York
as to death action damaqes.'8
10 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 2, at 41, 172 N.E.2d at
529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (dictum).
11 N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 132.
12 Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943);
Mertz v.
Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
13 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 NY.2d 34, 41-42, 172 N.E.2d
526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137 (1961) (dictum).
14 Id. at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136 (dictum).
15 194 U.S. 120 (1904). The plaintiff brought this action in a Texas
circuit court for wrongful death. The basis of the action was a Mexican
statute, death having occurred in Mexico. The Court held that it was error
to instruct the jury that damages were to be measured by Texas law.
16 Id. at 126.
17 Ibid. Mr. Justice Holmes reaffirmed this view in Cuba R.R. v. Crosby,
222 U.S. 473 (1912) and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542
(1914); see Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949).
But see, Klaxton Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)
wherein the Court found that prejudgment interest was an incidental item of
damages with respect to which a forum court has been commonly free to
apply its own law or some other law as it sees fit. Id. at 498.
18 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 13, at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d
at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. Judge Fuld and Judge Froessel wrote separate
concurring opinions in which the former found no justification for going
beyond the precise issue presented (whether the plaintiff had a second cause
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The question presented to the Second Circuit in Pearson was
whether the district court, relying on Judge Desmond's opinion
in Kilberg as the law in New York, had violated the full faith
and credit clause " in not giving effect to the Massachusetts limitation. The requirements of full faith and credit in the area of
state statutes have been subject to varying interpretations. It
has been said that "the essence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is that certain transactions, wherever in the United States they
may be litigated, shall have the same legal consequences as they
would have in the place where they occurred." 20 It has also been
said that the clause was intended to impose a duty on the forum
to apply 21
the statutes of another state upon which a cause of action
is found.
However, this clause has also been construed so as to allow a
forum, which has a "legitimate interest" in the outcome of the suit,
to apply all of its own law, without regard to the law of the place
where the injury occurred. 22 In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
2 3
Acc. Comn.'n,

a contract of employment was drawn in California

for work which was to be performed in Alaska, where the injury
occurred. The contract provided that should any injury occur,
the parties would be bound by the Alaska compensation law. On
the other hand, California compensation law provided that the
California commission was to have exclusive jurisdiction in all
controversies arising from injuries without the state where the
injured employee was a resident of California at the time of
the injury and the contract of employment was made in California.
The Supreme Court found the "legitimate interest" of California
to be (1) an expressed legislative policy that the California compensation laws should have exclusive applicability in all actions

of action for breach of contract to carry safely), and the latter stated that
the Chief Judge's dictum was "in effect overruling numerous decisions of
this court, and completely disregarding the overwhelming weight of authority
in this country." Id. at 46, 172 N.E.2d at 532, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
19 U.S. Co~sT. art. IV, § 1.
20First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 400 (1952)
(concurring opinion).
21 Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in
the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARv. L. REv. 533, 544 (1926). The
author points out that to argue that the only duty imposed by the clause is to
recognize the validity of the foreign statute, and then contend that the statute
only operates as law in the courts of the state which enacted it, is to make
the full faith and credit clause meaningless. Ibid.
22 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)
see Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 15 (1961) (dictum).
23 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, supra note 22, at
547.
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within its courts, and (2) to prevent 2the
injured employee from
4
becoming a public charge of the state.
Where the interests of two states come into conflict, the
Supreme Court weighs the two interests one against the other
and accordingly determines whether the full faith and credit
clause requires the forum to apply the law of the other state.25
In Hughes v. Fetter,26 the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which had dismissed a
wrongful death action instituted in Wisconsin for a death suffered
in Illinois. A Wisconsin statute permitted an action only for
deaths caused within the state. In weighing the interests involved,
the Court held that the Wisconsin statute violated the full faith
and credit clause. It noted that while the clause does not automatically compel a forum to subordinate its own statutory policy
to a conflicting statute of another state, Wisconsin was not
antagonistic to wrongful death actions 27 and to give effect to the
Wisconsin exclusionary rule might amount to a deprivation of
all opportunity to enforce a valid death claim created by Illinois. 28
The majority in the panel decision in Pearson stated that the
conflict between the strong unifying principle embodied in the full
faith and credit clause and the public policy of New York, as
expressed in. the Kilberg dictum, was analogous to the conflict
presented in Hughes.29 The panel, applying the rationale of
Hughes, found that New York had no antagonism to wrongful
death actions, and as between the two conflicting interests, that
of full faith. and credit should prevail. 30 The panel found that
if the defendant were deprived of the protection of the limitation
imposed by the law which created the liability, he would be
unjustly treated.31
On rehearing en banc, the majority noted that it and the
minority agreed New York had sufficient "contacts" with the
transaction to warrant the application of all New York law.3 2
24 See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 9, 19-20 (1958).
25 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, supra note 22,
at 502.

26341
U.S. 609 (1951).
27
Id. at 612.
28 Id. at 613.

29 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 134, rev'd en banc,
309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).

30 Ibid.
3i Id. at 135; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904) ; Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
32 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 1962).
The Court found the sufficient contacts of New York to be (a) the purchase

of the ticket at a New York office of a foreign corporation doing a large

part of its business in New York; (b) the decedent's domicile in New York,
and the fact that most of the flight was conducted over New York; and (c)
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However, the majority did not agree with the argument that
although New York was not required to give any faith or credit
to the Massachusetts statute, once it gave some faith and credit,
it should have given full faith and credit. 33 Rather, a single
transaction may contain several distinct issues in which either or
both states might have a "legitimate interest" to the extent that
each state would be justified in applying its own law.34 The fact
that New York had adhered to a traditional choice-of-law rule by
designating the Massachusetts statute as the basis of the cause of
action, said the Court, does not mean that that statute is controlling on all the issues or that New York is precluded from
applying 35its own law to an issue in which it has a "legitimate
interest."
While both Pearson and Kilberg set forth public policy arguments to sustain their finding that the Massachusetts limitation is
not applicable in New York, the approaches of the courts are
not the same. Kilberg, applying the public policy of New York
against limitations on damages in a wrongful death action, determined that damages are a procedural matter and are thus
governed by New York law. Pearson, however, cautions against
making substantive-procedural determinations. The majority in
Pearson stated they would not condone a forum's application of
its own rules in a "wanton manner by labeling matters 'procedural'
while arbitrarily choosing the parts of a foreign statute it wishes
to enforce by labeling them 'substantive'." 36
The Pearson approach is an extension of the "legitimate
interest" theory as developed by the Supreme Court in Alaska
Packers which would allow a forum, having a legitimate interest
in the outcome, to apply all of its own law. Recognizing that an
action contains several distinct issues and that the forum may have
a "legitimate interest" in some of these issues, Pearson makes
the substantive law of the forum applicable to those issues in
which it has the "legitimate interest" while the substantive law
of the lex loci controls on the other issues. It is this application
of the substantive law of both the lex loci and the lex fori which
makes unique Pearson's application of the "legitimate interest'"
theory.

the New York domicile of the administratrix and beneficiary under the
wrongful death act.
33 Ibid.
34
Id. at 560. The Court found the distinct issues in the instant case to
be the conduct which created the liability, the parties who may bring the
action, the extent of the liability, and the period during which the cause of
action may be sued upon. Id. at 561.
3
3 5Id. at 560-61.
6Id. at 559.
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What Pearson does, in effect, is split the Massachusetts
statute. It applies the first part of that statute which gives rise
to the liability, but disregards the second part which limits the
amount of that liability. It could be argued that the splitting
of the Massachusetts statute in the present case did not prejudice
the defendant because in either jurisdiction it would have been
liable for damages.3 7 It would seem that this argument could
not be made if, for example, the Massachusetts statute, instead
of limiting the liability of carriers, had made them immune from
suit. The question would then arise whether a court, following
the Pearson rationale, could constitutionally apply the part of the
Massachusetts statute which gives a cause of action for wrongful
death, and disregard the part of that statute which would make
the defendant immune from such suit.38

Certainly, such a splitting

of the Massachusetts statute would prejudice the rights of the
defendant. Application of the Pearson rationale, under such
circumstances, would seem to undermine the entire rationale of
the full faith and credit clause.

M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SIXTH AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCAPPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL REQUIRED FOR INDIGENT DEESS FENDANT IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES. - Petitioner, an indigent de-

fendant, convicted in a Florida state court of a felony - breaking
and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor - filed a habeas
corpus petition in the Supreme Court of Florida alleging that
the refusal of the trial court to appoint defense counsel was a
denial of his right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment of the federal constitution.' That court denied relief.
37 However, the dissent in Pearson would not make such an argument.
A layman would certainly feel that he would have been prejudiced if his
liability were extended from $15,000 to $160,000 (the amount recovered by
the plaintiff in the present case). Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra
note 32, at 567-68.
38 The argument has also been made that since the Massachusetts statute
is the source of the plaintiff's right to maintain the wrongful death action,
the Massachusetts legislature, by providing for the liability limitation,
intended to create only a limited right where none existed before. 35 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 357, 361 (1961).
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
Under the laws of the State of Florida, however, a court can only appoint
counsel in criminal cases where a capital offense is charged. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §909.21 (1944).

